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Abstract: This case note discusses the intrusion-based approach to the tort of misuse of 
private information adopted by the Supreme Court in PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd. It 
argues that the approach avoids the “King Canute” criticism of privacy injunctions based on 
confidentiality or secrecy in favour of a more geographically modest remedy, building storm 
defences rather than attempting to hold back the tide. In doing so, it abandons an abstract 
notion of information in the “public domain” in favour of more concrete notions of harm 
caused by the misuse of private information and should be welcomed.   
 
 
The image of King Canute trying to hold back the tide is a popular one used to critique 
attempts by national courts to restrain the publication of private information in the face of a 
global and online media. The truth, or at least the allegation, will out. The issue is certainly 
not a new one. The futility of an injunction in England and Wales, given extensive 
publication out of the jurisdiction, played a key role in the Spycatcher litigation in the late 
1980s. Such futility is a feature of confidentiality or secrecy: the tide of information cannot 
be held back in an information age. In PJS v News Group Newspapers [2016] UKSC 26, the 
Supreme Court, endorsing an approach developed by the High Court in several earlier 
authorities, distinguished between protecting confidentiality and preventing intrusion as 
twin rationales for the tort of misuse of private information. The intrusion of a pending 
media storm in the jurisdiction, repeating allegations already widely available, was a further 
misuse of private information and could usefully be restrained in England and Wales. Even 
where confidentiality had already been lost, privacy injunctions could continue to play a 
useful role as a defence against the significant additional intrusion, at least where it could 
be practicably restrained, and the pending media storm which would accompany a lifting of 
the injunction represented one such case. 
The defendant made an application to set aside an interim injunction restraining the 
publication of details of alleged extra-marital sexual activities between the claimant and 
another couple. The claimant and his partner were well-known in entertainment and had 
two young children. He had successfully obtained an interim injunction in January 2016. 
However, by April 2016 the details had been published in print and online media by news 
organisations in the USA, Canada and Scotland and were also widely available on social 
media. The defendant argued that the injunction now served no further useful purpose and 
was an unjustified interference with the defendant’s Article 10 ECHR rights. The relevant 
private information was now in the public domain. 
The majority of the Supreme Court distinguished between the protection of 
confidentiality and the prevention of intrusion. Lord Neuberger commented that had 
confidentiality or secrecy been the basis of the case, then an application for an injunction 
“would have substantial difficulties” (paragraph 57). However, he distinguished 
confidentiality from intrusion and held that “claims based on respect for privacy and family 
life do not depend on confidentiality (or secrecy) alone” (paragraph 58). Lord Mance held 
that the repetition of private information was “capable of constituting a further tort of 
invasion of privacy, even in relation to persons to whom disclosure or publication was 
previously made” (paragraph 32). 
The Supreme Court endorsed the approach developed by the High Court in a number of 
authorities emphasising the role of intrusion in the “repetition of known facts” (JIH v News 
Group Newspapers Ltd [2010] EMLR 9, paragraph 59, per Tugendhat J). Lord Mance, at 
paragraph 29, endorsed paragraphs 23 to 26 of Eady J.’s judgment in CTB v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1326 (QB), in which he said that “the modern law of privacy is 
not concerned solely with information or ‘secrets’: it is also concerned importantly with 
intrusion… so long as the court is in a position to prevent some of that intrusion and 
distress, depending on the individual circumstances, it may be appropriate to maintain that 
degree of protection”. Similarly, Lord Mance quoted with approval Tugendhat J. in CTB v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1334 (QB), at paragraph 3, where he said “if the 
purpose of this injunction were to preserve a secret, it would have failed its purpose. But in 
so far as its purpose is to prevent intrusion or harassment, it has not failed”. MacDonald J. 
had also approved of these comments in H v A (No 2) [2016] 1 FCR 338, paragraph 47. Lord 
Neuberger also referred to a range of High Court decisions concerning intrusion to 
demonstrate a “clear, principled and consistent approach at first instance” by “highly 
respected” judges who were mainly “highly experienced in media law and practice” 
(paragraphs 58 to 60). He also endorsed their approach. 
I argue that placing emphasis on the role of the tort of misuse of private information and 
privacy injunctions in preventing intrusion into private life has two important and desirable 
effects and should be welcomed.  
First, the endorsement by the Supreme Court of a broadening of the purpose of the tort 
of misuse of private information beyond confidentiality or secrecy to intrusion secures a 
more modest but realistic remedy. Privacy injunctions are only enforceable within the 
jurisdiction. A focus on intrusion within the jurisdiction results in a more realistic treatment 
than attempts to limit global disclosure which are not backed by adequate enforcement 
mechanisms. A focus on intrusion avoids the “King Canute” criticism by focusing on a more 
achievable objective. The majority held that the injunction would continue to serve a useful 
purpose in preventing the further intrusion that would result from the “media storm” that 
would otherwise follow in England and Wales (paragraph 35). It therefore sought to relieve 
the claimant of intrusion only within the jurisdiction, to the extent it could, in particular by 
focussing on print media and online publishers based in England and Wales. The Court also 
recognised that an injunction would not stem the flow of information forever, even to the 
claimant’s children (paragraph 9). Recognising the value of a local respite, the more modest 
remedy, is a positive development. 
Secondly, a shift from confidentiality or secrecy to intrusion permitted the court to move 
from a rather abstract notion of the “public domain” to a more concrete notion of the 
harms that disclosure in a particular location and medium would do to the claimant and his 
family.  
The majority’s adoption of an intrusion-based approach allowed it to focus in a concrete 
manner on the harm that the claimant and his family might suffer. Lord Mance pointed to 
the “further unrestricted and extensive coverage in hard copy as well as other media in 
England and Wales” (paragraph 1) that would result from setting aside the injunction. He 
added that it would “add extensively, and in a qualitatively different medium” (paragraph 1) 
to the invasion of privacy suffered by the claimant and his family. Lord Mance considered 
that “open hard copy exposure, as well no doubt as further internet exposure, is likely to 
add significantly to the overall intrusiveness and distress involved” (paragraph 25). There 
was a “qualitative difference in intrusiveness and distress likely to be involved” (paragraph 
35). For Lord Mance a national print “media storm” would “add a different and in some 
respects more enduring dimension to the existing invasions of privacy being perpetrated in 
the internet” (paragraph 45). 
Lord Neuberger took a similar view of the difference between internet dissemination 
and national print media: 
 
It is one thing for what should be private information to be unlawfully disseminated: 
it is quite another for that information to be recorded in eye-catching headlines and 
sensational terms in a national newspaper, or to be freely available on search 
engines in this jurisdiction to anyone searching for PJS or YMA, or indeed AB, by 
name in a different connection. (paragraph 68) 
 
For Lord Neuberger “the perception that a story in a newspaper has greater influence, 
credibility and reach, as well greater potential for intrusion, than the same story on the 
internet” (paragraph 69) was an important consideration. 
By contrast for Lord Toulson in dissent, the fact that confidentiality had been lost was 
decisive as “the court needs to be very cautious about granting an injunction preventing 
publication of what is widely known, if it is not to lose public respect for the law by giving 
the appearance of being out of touch with reality” (paragraph 88). For Lord Toulson, the 
“world of public information is interactive and indivisible” (paragraph 89).  
The judgments highlight the conceptual differences underlying the intrusion and 
confidentiality approaches. For the focus on confidentiality, the “public domain” is global, 
interconnected and abstract. Information is either “out there” or it is not and once it is “out 
there” it is futile to attempt to intervene. This encourages an all or nothing approach to 
injunctions. Intrusion focusses on the local and concrete harm to the claimant at a particular 
time. It is more sensitive to where, when and how that repetition occurs and the harm it 
entails to the particular claimant. This encourages a more nuanced and sensitive approach.  
Although privacy injunctions may not be able to hold back the tide, they can provide 
defences to provide time and space, free from the intrusion of a media storm, for private 
and family life. Rather than fear that public respect for the law will be weakened, this 
modest but realistic remedy aimed at concrete relief should do much to strengthen respect 
for the law. 
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